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1. Introduction 
In his recent book William Riker (1982) argues that the results of social- 
choice theory require that we lower our traditional aspirations for the role 
of elections in democratic theory. In particular, he concludes that social- 
choice theory sounds the death knell for the 'populist' interpretation of 
voting, the view that election outcomes embody the 'collective will' of the 
electorate. Other, more modest claims about elections also fall to the 
theorems of social-choice, until we remain with the extremely modest claim 
embodied in Riker's 'liberal' interpretation of voting. On this view elections 
provide the possibility of rejecting unpopular leaders, and the major value 
of elections is as a weapon against government tyranny. 
Riker's argument proceeds in several stages. First, he reviews the analysis 
of social-choice in n-dimensional issue spaces. This literature conclusively 
demonstrates that the necessary and sufficient conditions for a majority 
voting equilibrium are so strict that one cannot expect them to ever be met. 1 
Thus Riker consigns the notion of a 'majority will' to the same 'dust bin' 
to which earlier liberals (from Madison to Bentley) had consigned 
Rousseau's general will. 
Having discovered at the most abstract level that the search for a collec- 
tive will of the electorate is pointless, for no such will exists, Riker proceeds 
to review the conclusions of social-choice theory about elections with a 
finite number of candidates. Here Arrow's theorem (1963) and its progeny 
take over. Not only do majority cycles still occur, but different systems with 
strong axiomatic credentials may select different candidates. Thus, even at 
this level the prospect is slight that we can endow election outcomes with 
great normative significance. But the prospects disappear almost entirely, 
in Riker's judgment, when we consider the manipulability theorems of 
social-choice theory. In his words: 
I come now to the most  depressing o f  the discoveries of  social-choice theory, which is: Even 
if a society agrees on a method of  voting and even if it produces a coherent outcome,  we still 
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do not know whether this outcome truly reflects the values of the voters or whether it is the 
result of some kind of manipulation. (1978: 14) 
•.. Since we cannot know whether manipulation has occurred, the truth and meaning of all 
outcomes is thereby rendered dubious... Manipulated outcomes are meaningless because they 
are manipulated and unmanipulated outcomes are meaningless because they cannot be 
distinguished from manipulated ones. (1982: 236-237) 
The destruction of the populist ideal is now complete. Its very coherence 
disintegrates at the abstract level, and even the more modest claim, that elec- 
tion outcomes are reflections of  a 'major i ty  will' on a given set of  can- 
didates, is defeated because we cannot remove the shadow of  doubt that the 
manipulability theorems cast over all election outcomes. In the face of  this 
evidence, Riker retreats to the liberal interpretation of  voting: elections are 
important  in a democratic society because they offer a possibility of  reject- 
ing unpopular  leadership. 
This essay tries to recapture at least some middle ground from Riker 's  
claim by arguing that the ' ineradicable uncertainty'  (1978: 15) that follows 
from the possibility of  manipulation is more eradicable than Riker leads us 
to believe. Such an argument cannot by itself reestablish earlier claims for 
elections since it addresses only the final stage of  Riker 's  argument.  But if 
we have reason to believe that the other stages of  Riker 's  argument are also 
rebuttable, as I suggest by citing the work of others ,  then a counter to the 
manipula t ion  argument,  in combination with those other counter- 
arguments,  will do much to restore the claim that we can interpret voting 
outcomes as meaningful expressions of  the will of  the majori ty of  voters 
concerning a given set of  candidates. I f  this argument fails to revive fully 
the populist vision, as it must, nevertheless it claims a deeper role for elec- 
tions in democratic theory than does Riker 's  liberal alternative. 
2. Stability in majority voting 
The theorems that demonstrate the hopeless prospects for the stability of  
majori ty rule (Plott, 1967; McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1978) deal by far the 
greatest damage to the populist ideal. These theorems establish the im- 
plausibility of  there being an abstract majori ty will t h a t a n  election might 
reveal. But in an important  recent paper,  Nicholas Miller (1983) argues con- 
vincingly that the inherent intransitivity of  majori ty choice, which seems so 
pathological f rom the standpoint of  social-choice theory, is the very 
characteristic that leads many  political theorists to see in a pluralist political 
system the promise of  a stable democratic society. Briefly, Miller argues that 
pluralism rests its claim for long-run stability on the observation that losers 
in any given election have reason to believe that hard work and clever 
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strategy between elections can yield a real chance of their being winners in 
the next election. This 'wait tir next year' spirit could not thrive, Miller 
asserts, in a society in which a stable majority will prevails, in the sense that 
social-choice theory seeks. Miller thus sees the short-term instability that 
plagues social-choice theory to be the very characteristic of a pluralist socie- 
ty that insures its long-run political stability. Miller's claim is thus not that 
the theorems are wrong, or that Riker's inferences from them are mistaken, 
but that when viewed from another vantage point, we might not choose to 
have it any other way. Miller's insightful analysis dispels some of the sense 
of doom that social-choice literature casts over elections in Riker's 
interpretation. 
Having ascertained that the absence of majority equilibrium is both in- 
evitable and perhaps functional after all, what can we say for elections at 
the next level? Here, the democratic process includes periodic elections 
among given (finite) sets of candidates. If majority winners exist for a series 
of such elections, and a voting system can reliably select them, then the 
claim that these voting outcomes are politically legitimate is a strong one. 
Several barriers to this view of elections remain, but none seems insurmoun- 
table. Voting cycles may still exist, but their frequency may be sufficiently 
low to make them unimportant. Many voting systems can select majority 
winners if they exist, and these systems are susceptible to manipulation via 
alterations in the set of candidates only if a voting cycle can be manufac- 
tured, a task that is not straightforward in real elections. Hence, we arrive 
at the problem of manipulation, which Riker believes is decisive. This essay 
tries to restore hope for a more fully democratic interpretation of election 
outcomes by showing, for at least one voting system, that we can substan- 
tially eradicate the uncertainty that the possibility of manipulation creates 
for the legitimacy of elections outcomes. If this is the case, then it is 
reasonable to view election outcomes as expressions of a majority will 
among the given candidates. 
The analysis focuses on the performance of three voting systems in elec- 
tions involving 1,000 voters and four candidates. 2 Of greatest interest is the 
Kemeny system, which selects a winning ordering of the candidates. It pro- 
ceeds by counting the number of 'pairwise switches' among candidates that 
would be necessary to convert all voter preferences into a single preference 
ordering. The ordering that would require the fewest switches is the winning 
ordering. Kemeny (1959) shows that the number of switches meets the ax- 
ioms for a distance metric, and that the winning Kemeny ordering is in this 
sense the ordering that is 'closest' to the given set of voter preferences. 
Levenglick (1975) shows that the Kemeny system has an impressive set of 
axiomatic credentials, including symmetry, faithfulness, consistency, and 
the Condorcet criterion. In light of Levenglick's analysis, the Kemeny 
system meets our standards of how a voting system ought to behave. This 
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study compares the Kemeny system with plurality voting and the Borda rule 
to compare its performance with those of the system we now use most often 
and a system that also has impressive (but somewhat different) axiomatic 
credentials (Young, 1974). My results indicate that Kemeny succeeds where 
the others fail, and they strongly suggest that the Kemeny method is capable 
of  solving the problems of social-choice theory as well as any other system, 
and that we can place greater normative emphasis on election outcomes than 
Riker's liberal interpretation would allow. 
I will refer to the winner of an election in which voters express their true 
(or 'sincere') preferences as the 'sincere' winner. An election is 
'manipulated' when preference misrepresentation by voters leads to the 
selection of a candidate other than the 'sincere' winner. The key to our 
analysis is the relationship between the twin demons of social-choice theory 
- voting cycles and manipulated outcomes - a relationship that social- 
choice theorists seem not to have noticed. Under certain circumstances these 
events are more likely to occur together than alone. This observation lies at 
the heart of the Bayesian analysis constructed here, which shows that 
whether or not a majority-voting cycle occurs is, under a wide variety of cir- 
cumstances, an accurate indication of whether or not the outcome of the 
election has been manipulated. This analysis suggests that Riker's claim, 
that the 'truth and meaning of all outcomes is thereby rendered dubious,' 
(1982: 236) is too sweeping, for it will often be possible to eliminate much 
of the uncertainty concerning th_e 'sincerity' of the outcome by observing 
whether or not a cycle has occurred. 
To a great extent, the strength of Riker's conclusion rests on the uncer- 
tainty that surrounds the question of whether voters have expressed their 
sincere (true) preferences. For Riker, this uncertainty is ineradicable, 
because 'to prove that strategic voting occurs, one must know what voters 
thought as well as what they did. But observers can see only the deed, never 
the thought' (1978: 15). But this is not the only way of obtaining informa- 
tion about the sincerity of voters' deeds. If we can observe something other 
than the outcome of voting, and if this piece of information is a reliable 
signal about the sincerity of the outcome (i.e., whether the outcome differs 
from that which would obtain if all voters cast ballots containing sincere 
preferences), then the uncertainty about the legitimacy of the outcome 
diminishes considerably. 
The argument and the examples to follow will demonstrate that it is often 
possible to decrease greatly the uncertainty concerning whether or not the 
winner of an election is indeed the 'sincere' winner by observing a very sim- 
ple signal: whether or not an intransitive majority voting cycle has 
occurred. 3 Most studies of the likelihood of voting cycles among sincere 
preferences suggest that it is reasonably small, and work on spatial models 
shows the likelihood to be very small indeed. 4 On the other hand, the 
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strategies that manipulate election outcomes often create cycles in the pro- 
cess. The occurrence of a majority voting cycle in an actual election can thus 
be an imperfect signal of two things - a cycle in the sincere preferences or 
a manipulated outcome (or both). My analysis, which uses estimates of 
various probabilities derived from Monte Carlo methods, strongly suggests 
that in some kinds of electoral environments, and if certain kinds of social- 
choice functions are in use, whether or not a voting cycle exists can be a 
decisive signal concerning the likelihood that the election has selected the 
'sincere' winner. 
It is possible for the three voting methods to select different winners, 
given the same set of preferences. Since the question of which candidate 
ought to win is irresolvable in light of Arrow's theorem and others, I in- 
vestigate below only the probability of selecting the 'sincere' winner, that 
candidate who would be selected by a particular voting method given a 
sincere expression of preferences. It is worth noting that all three social- 
choice methods share one property that makes them particularly worthy of 
study: it is quite easy in each case to articulate a strategy for manipulating 
a voting outcome that is easily understood and is often an optimal strategy. 
3. The model 
Manipulating an election outcome ordinarily is a very complicated matter. 
One must estimate the voters' preferences and one must usually estimate 
their actions as well, for they may not vote sincerely. One way to study the 
question is to adapt the line of work Farquharson (1969) began on voting 
on candidates under a fixed agenda. One could seek to identify sophisticated 
voting equilibria for the election games under the different voting systems, 
and to evaluate the properties of these equilibria. Such an analysis assumes 
perfect information about voter preferences and assumes that each voter 
carries out the game-theoretic analysis for herself. In light of what we know 
about the actions of voters in mass elections, both of these assumptions 
seem heroic, and the results of such an analysis may bear little resemblance 
to the outcomes of naturally occurring elections in which preferences are 
misrepresented. I develop instead a model that recognizes that less than 
perfect information will be available and that the average voter is unlikely 
to have either the ability or the incentive to carry out the complex analysis 
necessary to find equilibrium strategies. This model assumes that a can- 
didate's campaign staff develops a manipulation strategy and then com- 
municates it to the candidate's supporters. To flesh out the model, imagine 
that a candidate's campaign staff has access to reliable information about 
who the likely sincere winner (candidate A) and runner-up (candidate B) will 
be, but no other information about the structure of voters' preferences) My 
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analysis focuses on attempts to manipulate B into the winners's spot. Can- 
didate B's staff must devise a manipulation strategy and communicate it to 
those voters who might join in the attempted manipulation on the basis of 
only this information. In mass elections the number of voters will be large 
and voters are likely to be geographically dispersed. These characteristics 
necessitate a general strategy that all who join in the attempted manipula- 
tion can follow, rather than a complex, multi-faceted strategy of the kind 
that might be possible with face-to-face communication among a few 
voters. Under these circumstances it seems very likely that candidate B's 
staff will communicate with voters thus: 6 
Plurality: 'If you prefer B to A, do not waste your vote on an also-ran, vote for B . '  
Borda/Kemeny: ' I f  you prefer B to A, cast a ballot with B at the top and A at the bottom. 
This is your best hope of avoiding the election of A.' 
The mere attempt to communicate these strategies does not guarantee 
their implementation. Some voters may be inattentive and never receive the 
message, and others may be lackadaisical or suspicious and not follow the 
strategy. For these reasons I treat the degree of compliance with the 
strategies as a variable. The model also includes the possibility that A's sup- 
porters may attempt to 'counter-manipulate' by casting ballots that reverse 
the positions of A and B in the strategies just given. Incorporating this 
response by A's supporters into the model provides some of the symmetric 
flavor of the equilibrium approach, but it does so in a manner that does not 
make unrealistic assumptions about voters' actions. Since the degrees of 
compliance with these strategies are variables, the range of possible actions 
that can result is obviously infinite, but for convenience I restrict the ex- 
amples to the consideration of only eight possible 'states of nature,' each 
of which is characterized by the proportion o f 'B 's  supporters' and 'A's  sup- 
porters' that follow their respective strategies as just outlined. Table 1 gives 
the states to be considered in the examples, The analysis is generalizable to 
as many states as seems necessary in any instance. State 1 is the case of 
sincere voting. States 4, 6, and 8 indicate a degree of balance in the 
misrepresentation of preferences. A prior subjective probability distribu- 
tion defined over these states is a basic input to the analysis. The following 
notation will be useful in developing the model: 
W: the actual winner (for a given voting system); 
SW: the sincere winner (for the same voting system); 
C: the existence of a cycle in the expressed preferences of the voters 
(C: no cycle in the expressed preferences); 
SC: the existence of a cycle in the sincere preferences of the voters. 
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Table 1. States of nature - Proportion of supporters who cast ballot in accordance with 
manipulation/counter-manipulation strategies 
State B's supporters A's supporters 
1 0 0 
2 1 0 
3 1/2 0 
4 1/2 1/2 
5 1/4 0 
6 1/4 1/4 
7 1/10 0 
8 1/10 1/10 
We observe the outcome of an election (either (W,C) or (W,(7)), and we 
would like to know these probabilities: 7 
P(W = SWIC) P(W = SWIC) 
P(SCI C) P(SCI C). 
As the examples to be presented show, whether or not a cycle exists 
sometimes will be sufficient to clear up much of  the uncertainty that Riker 
considers to be ineradicable. The probabilities we wish to determine are 
posterior probabilities, and they may be calculated using Bayes's rule if the 
associated likelihood functions are known and if a prior distribution over 
the states of  voting decisions is provided. Let P(S = J) denote this prior 
distribution. 
We can calculate the first posterior probability listed (the probability that 
the outcome has been manipulated given that a cycle exists) in either of  the 
two ways: 
and 
P(W ~ SW I C) = 
jZP(CIW~SW,  S = J )  P ( W ~ S W I S = J )  
j~ P(CI S = J) P(S = J) 
P ( W ~ S W I  C) = ~ P ( W ~ S W I  C, S = J) P(S = J I C), 
in which P(S = J I C) is the posterior probability of  state J given that a cycle 
has occurred. It is given by 
P(CIS = J) P(S = J) 
jZ P(C I S = J) P(S = J) 
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The likelihood functions in the numerator must be estimated, in my case 
on the basis of Monte Carlo methods, and we assess the prior distribution 
directly based on what we know or suspect about the election in question. 
We can derive similar expressions for the other probabilities. 
4. Results 
The following examples give posterior probabilities for the three voting 
systems under varying prior distributions listed in Table 2. These represent 
a dozen interesting sets of plausible conditions.8 The first four cases contain 
a range of values in which no counter-manipulation occurs. The remaining 
eight cases allow for varying degrees of misrepresentation and counter- 
misrepresentation. Among the interesting comparisons are B-H, C-E, and 
D-G, which contrast equivalent situations with and without counter-mis- 
representation. 
As Chamberlin and Cohen (1978) and Merrill (1984) demonstrate, varia- 
tion in the structure of collective preferences can greatly affect the perfor- 
mance of social-choice functions. To check the robustness of the conclu- 
sions that follow to variation in the environment, I study three en- 
vironments. In each case, I use 900 elections (each with four candidates and 
1000 voters) to estimate the necessary likelihood functions. The first en- 
vironment is an impartial culture, in which all 24 possible preference orders 
are equally likely to occur. As the second environment I use the spatial elec- 
tions Chamberlin and Cohen (1978) generate. These elections come from a 
four-dimensional spatial model with a specified covariance structure among 
the dimensions, and they use the Euclidean distance between candidate and 
voter positions to establish preference orderings. 9 The third environment 
Table 2. Prior probability distributions 
States of  nature 
Prior 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 
B .6 .2 .2 
C .8 .2 
D .1 .9 
E .8 .1 .1 
F .4 .3 .3 
G .1 .45 .45 
H .6 .1 .1 .1 .1 
I .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 
J .4 .2 .1 .2 .1 
K .4 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 
L .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 
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consists of elections that are a '50-50' mixture of voters from an impartial- 
culture model and voters from the Chamberlin-Cohen spatial model.i° 
Tables 3 and 4 show the effects on voting outcomes under the conditions 
encoded in the prior distributions of Table 2 (Results appear to three 
decimal places only if this is necessary to avoid rounding off to zero). The 
first result worthy of note is the differences across the three electoral en- 
vironments. Both cycles and manipulated outcomes occur more frequently 
in the impartial-culture elections than in the spatial elections. The '50-50' 
elections are the intermediate case, as expected. These results confirm the 
importance of assumptions about the structure of collective preferences to 
empirical conclusions about social-choice. 
The tables contain the 'base-rate' figures that give rise to Riker's con- 
cerns. In the absence of any further indication of whether or not misrepre- 
sentation has occurred, these tables suggest the frequencies with which we 
could expect to observe cycles and manipulated outcomes under the various 
conditions. With respect to manipulated outcomes, the Kemeny function is 
generally the most successful in selecting sincere winners, with plurality not 
far behind. These frequencies seem large enough to warrant Riker's level of 
concern, since the possibility of manipulated outcomes is real under all con- 
ditions, and under the impartial-culture assumption it is quite large. The fre- 
quencies of cycles contribute to the problem. Because of the manipulation 
strategy involved, plurality escapes most of the difficulty on this count, and 
since rank-ordered preferences would never be collected in the first place, 
its performance on this criterion is probably best ignored. But the Borda and 
Kemeny systems have substantial frequencies of cycles in all but the spatial 
case. The occurrence of cycles with such frequencies would certainly 
threaten the legitimacy of election outcomes, since with both of these 
methods the occurrence of a cycle will not slip by unnoticed because the data 
will be available to check for cycles. 
These tables add support for the potential chaos, whether observed or 
not, that Riker sees as inherent in the populist view of democratic choice. 
If these results were our only way of assessing the situation, Riker's pes- 
simistic conclusions would be difficult to reject. But the possibility of using 
the occurrence of a cycle as a signal about the occurrence of a manipulated 
outcome allows us to resolve substantially the uncertainty that clouds the 
legitimacy of the outcomes of specific elections (at least in the case of the 
Kemeny function). Tables 5a, 5b, and 5c show the posterior probabilities 
of a manipulated outcome and/or a sincere cycle conditional upon the 
observance or non-observance of a cycle. In general, the greater the prob- 
ability of misrepresentation of preferences, and the greater the degree of 
misrepresentation, the greater is the likelihood of a cycle and/or a 
manipulated outcome. The tables also indicate that using C or (7 as a signal 
has varied results. In the case of plurality voting, it is a relatively weak signal 
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Table 3. Frequencies of manipulated outcomes 
Prior Impartial culture Spatial 50-50 
P(W ¢ SW) P(W :~ SW) P(W :~ SW) 
P B K P B K P B K 
Sincere .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
A .76 .61 .67 .26 .50 .29 .47 .61 
B .36 .37 .27 .05 .18 .05 .13 .23 
C .16 .17 .08 .01 .06 .01 .03 .09 
D .72 .76 .35 .05 .26 .05 .15 .41 
E .08 .09 .04 .01 .03 .01 .02 .05 
F .26 .24 .12 .03 .09 .02 .06 .14 
G .38 .39 .18 .04 .14 .02 .09 .21 
H .20 .19 .14 .04 .09 .03 .08 .12 
I .41 .39 .27 .07 .19 .05 .16 .24 
J .38 .38 .27 .06 .18 .05 .14 .24 
K .31 .30 .24 .09 .17 .07 .18 .22 














Table 4. Frequencies of cycles 
Prior Impartial culture Spatial 50-50 
P(C) P(C) P(C) 
P B K P B K P B K 
Sincere .15 .15 .15 .004 .004 .004 .01 .01 .01 
A .12 .62 .75 .02 .30 .36 .09 .42 .49 
B .13 .35 .42 .01 .06 .08 .02 .12 .14 
C .14 .22 .26 .004 .02 .02 .02 .04 .05 
D .11 .48 .65 .01 .06 .08 .03 .12 .16 
E .13 .18 .20 .004 .01 .01 .02 .03 .03 
F .09 .25 .30 .004 .02 .03 .02 .05 .06 
G .07 .30 .38 .004 .03 .04 .03 .07 .09 
H .11 .24 .27 .01 .03 .04 .02 .07 .08 
I .08 .34 .40 .01 .06 .08 .03 .12 .14 
J .11 .34 .41 .01 .06 .08 .03 .12 .14 
K .09 .30 .34 .01 .08 .10 .03 .13 .15 
L .08 .38 .43 .08 .14 .17 .06 .22 .26 
c o n c e r n i n g  m a n i p u l a t e d  o u t c o m e s  b u t  a r e l a t i v e l y  s t r o n g  s igna l  c o n c e r n i n g  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a s i nce r e  cycle .  F o r  t h e  B o r d a  a n d  K e m e n y  s y s t e m s ,  t h e  
r e su l t s  a r e  r e v e r s e d .  O n l y  in  t h e  ca se  o f  t h e  K e m e n y  f u n c t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  is 
t h e  s igna l  e x t r e m e l y  dec i s ive .  F o r  t h e  K e m e n y  s y s t e m ,  i f  a cyc le  is n o t  
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chosen and that this winner is a sincere Condorcet winner. Since cycles are 
reasonably unlikely to occur, we can accept the vast majority of Kemeny 
outcomes for what we wish them to be - the sincere indication of  the wishes 
of  the majority of voters. In these instances the uncertainty that gives rise 
to Riker's pessimism seems to be genuinely eradicated. 
The uncertainty is resolved less if we observe a cycle. For plurality voting, 
a cycle tells us very little about the occurrence of a manipulated outcome, 
but it is a fairly reliable signal of  a sincere cycle. This result occurs because 
the manipulation strategy for the plurality system, when successfully im- 
plemented, is much less likely to generate cycles. Except for the spatial elec- 
tions, a cycle with the Borda rule is a reasonably strong signal of a 
manipulated outcome. For the Kemeny system the signal is weaker than it 
is for the Borda system, except for the spatial elections. In no case does the 
strength of the signal approach that for the Kemeny function in the absence 
of a cycle. 
It is possible to compute several measures tha t  indicate the overall 
strength of using C or (~ as a signal of manipulated outcomes. For instance, 
one can compute the proportion of elections in which a rule using the signal 
to predict manipulated outcomes does so correctly. Such a rule would be: 
1. if a cycle has occurred, and P(W~eSWlC)  > .5, guess that the outcome was manipulated; 
2. if a cycle has not occurred, and P ( W ~ S W l C )  > .5, guess that the outcome was mani- 
pulated 
3. otherwise, guess that  the outcome is sincere. 
Using this rule, the probability of a correct guess is: 
P* = max[P(W~SWlC) ,  1 - P(W~SWIC)]*P(C) + 
max[P(W~SWIC) ,  1 - P(W~SWIC')]*P(C). 
The Goodman-Kruskal lambda (k) gives another measure of the signal's 
strength, which indicates the reduction in the error rate that results from 
using a signal. This reduction is given by ~, = [P - (1 - P*)]/~, in which 
= min[P(W~SW),  1 - P(W:~SW)] is the error rate if one were to guess on 
each occurrence the outcome most likely to occur. Table 6 shows the values 
of  these two measures. Notice that in all but one case (prior D for the impar- 
tial culture elections), the Kemeny system has the largest value of P(correct). 
Notice also that )~ is non-zero 190/0, 75%, and 67% of the time for the 
plurality, Borda, and Kemeny systems, respectively. For the last two 
systems, the signal very significantly improves the prediction rate, because 
the manipulation strategy, if successful, generally results in a voting cycle. 
It must do so in the case of the Kemeny system, unless one already exists. 
This observation explains why C is a stronger signal of a sincere outcome 
for the Kemeny system than the Borda system, it also explains why, when 
~o 
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~, is non-zero for the Kemeny system, it is almost always greater than the 
value of X for the Borda rule. 
5. Discussion 
Riker's pessimism about the claims that one can make about voting out- 
comes springs from several sources: the absence of equilibria in multidimen- 
sional representations of the problem; the lack of any convincingly 'best' 
voting system; and the omnipresent threat of manipulability. Faced with 
these problems, Riker rejects what he calls the populist view of voting out- 
comes as the expression of a collective will, in favor of what he calls the 
liberal interpretation of voting, which simply requires that voting processes 
have some chance of throwing rascals out of office. Given the heavy nor- 
mative price that one pays in adopting such a conclusion, it seems to me that 
it should be done reluctantly and only in the face of convincing evidence. 
For Riker, the 'ineradicable uncertainty' surrounding the sincerity of voting 
outcomes is a crucial piece of evidence. The results presented here strongly 
suggest that Riker's judgment about the threat of manipulation is too 
sweeping, and that at least in the case of the Kemeny voting system, the pro- 
blem can be overcome. 
The claim that taking a Bayesian view of this problem allows one to erase 
the  uncertainty concerning manipulation may strike some readers as missing 
Riker's point, for part of his argument, surely, is that we could never 
reliably assess the prior probability distribution necessary for the calcula- 
tions. To do so would require us to do the very thing that he suggests we 
cannot do: assess the thought as well as the deed. This claim seems true, but 
the claim for the Kemeny function is that its ability to signal sincere out- 
comes is robust over all of the priors I investigate. If this property is general, 
then doubts about our ability to assess reliably the prior distribution are not 
telling ones. 
The key to the Kemeny function's success is that it always selects a Con- 
dorcet winner if one exists. Manipulation of this system requires, therefore, 
that a cycle be established if one does not already exist. A manipulated out- 
come can occur in the absence of a cycle only if a cycle exists in the sincere 
preferences and if it was undone in the process of manipulation. This obser- 
vation, combined with the observation that sincere cycles are relatively rare, 
is what makes the absence of a cycle a nearly flawless signal that the elec- 
torate chose the sincere winner, xl 
Under most of the conditions studied, a cycle usually will not occur, and 
in these cases we can be nearly certain that the electorate chose the sincere 
Condorcet winner. Given the theorems of social-choice theory concerning 
the general instability of majority rule, the selection of a Condorcet winner 
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with such a high level of confidence is about the best one can hope for in 
a voting method. This restores some degree of confidence that voting can 
indeed reflect a majority will among a given set of candidates. 
It remains true that a cycle occasionally will occur. In these cases it is more 
likely that the cycle is an indication of a manipulated outcome than of a cy- 
cle in the sincere preferences. One can respond in several ways to such a cy- 
cle. We could accept the Kemeny winner as is, even though its legitimacy 
seems shaky. We could rerun the election, hoping perhaps that A's sup- 
porters may respond in kind (which lowers the probability of a cycle), there- 
fore increasing the likelihood of an apparently legitimate outcome. Or, we 
could adapt the Kemeny rule to say that in the case of a cycle, the alternative 
that defeats the Kemeny winner is selected, on the grounds that the outcome 
has most likely been manipulated. If A is sincerely preferred to B, then B's 
supporters cannot change this. They must hope to engineer a C beats A 
beats B beats C cycle. In this case, if B is the Kemeny-system winner (that 
is, the manipulation works), selecting A (which still defeats B in a pairwise 
comparison) would 'undo' the manipulation. 12 
In sum, the Kemeny function goes a considerable way toward addressing 
the problems that concern Riker. It selects Condorcet winners, and in the 
great majority of cases it reassures us about the legitimacy of the choice, 
because of the absence of a cycle. Even if a cycle is found-to exist, several 
options remain open. In addition, the Condorcet property means that the 
Kemeny function is much less vulnerable than are the other two methods to 
manipulation via variation in the set of candidates. This provides an impor- 
tant defense against another potential threat to the legitimacy of its 
outcomes. 
These properties of the Kemeny function lead me to disagree with Pro- 
fessor Riker's pessimistic view of the theory of democracy. We can indeed 
find a voting method that selects Condorcet winners and which, while not 
invulnerable to manipulation, can give a highly reliable signal concerning 
the outcome's sincerity. Although these properties are not all that one 
would ideally ask of a voting system, they are also not so little as to convince 
me to lower my aspirations for voting to the minimal level of Riker's liberal 
interpretation. 
NOTES 
1. See Endow and Hinich (1983) for a recent clarification concerning these conditions. 
2. I ignore the possibility of manipulating the slate of candidates to manipulate the outcome. 
3. Here I consider only voting cycles with intransitive strict preferences, not indifference. 
Some experimentation with the use of cycles containing indifference as a signal show no 
significant differences in results. 
4. For instance, the probability of a cycle in a four-candidate, large electorate election is ap- 
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proximately .16 if a large number of voters are selected from an impartial culture. 
Chamberlin and Cohen (1978) report a much smaller frequency of cycles (4 out of 900) in 
elections based on a spatial model. Recently, Merrill (1984) checks the incidence of Con- 
dorcet winners in several thousand spatial elections and finds them to exist more than 98 
percent of the time. 
5. This assumption seems quite plausible for plurality voting, in which polling data commonly 
suffice. If the other systems were in use, it seems likely that polls would obtain rank- 
ordered preferences, permitting the necessary forecasts. I ignore the possibility of 
manipulating polling outcomes by misrepresenting preferences to pollsters. 
6. This strategy for manipulating plurality voting is optimal. The strategy for the Borda rule 
occasionally backfire, defeating A but also B, since the strategy may aid C and/or D as 
well. Although strategies exist that avoid this problem, they involve degrees of information 
and communication that exceed reasonable bounds for mass elections. It is also possible 
that strategies exist that manipulate the Borda rule with less chance of creating a cycle, but 
they would be difficult to ascertain and once again would require nearly perfect informa- 
tion about voters' sincere preferences. We know little about manipulating the Kemeny 
system, but as with the Borda rule, the strategy noted here is likely to suffice in many cases, 
if any will. 
7. Even under plurality voting, the analysis assumes that rank-ordered preferences are obtain- 
ed. Although unreal, the assumption permits a comparable analysis of all three voting 
methods, as well as a demonstration that the existence of a cycle is not always conclusive 
evidence about manipulability. The strategy for manipulating plurality voting is less likely 
to generate cycles, and the existence of a cycle is therefore a much weaker signal of 
manipulation. 
8. I selected these cases from among several dozens studied. The cases included here contain 
all of the interesting findings. 
9. Chamberlin and Cohen (1978) generate 300 elections at each of three levels of candidate 
dispersion relative to voter dispersion in the issue space. I have combined these three sets 
of elections here. See Chamberlin and Cohen (1978) for further details of the model, in- 
cluding the covariance structure. 
10. I generate these elections by adding 1000 newly generated impartial-culture voters to each 
of the spatial elections, and then dividing each frequency by two and rounding off. The 
'50-50 '  elections are thus not independent of the spatial elections, but both sets are in- 
dependent of the impartial-culture elections that are studied. 
11. My own hunch is that analyses based on impartial-culture assumptions greatly overstate 
the likelihood of cycles in naturally occurring elections with many voters. I think it much 
more likely that the '50-50 '  elections analyzed here are a reasonable best guess about the 
form of naturally occurring elections. 
12. As one referee correctly noted, such a move changes the nature of the voting system. Voters 
would then have incentives to generate a cycle in which their preferred candidate was the 
one who defeated the apparent Kemeny-system winner. On both theoretical and practical 
grounds, this proposal has considerable problems, and it is included here simply to indicate 
a way in which one might try to foil attempts at manipulation. 
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